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THE TAKINGS CLAUSE: THE EVOLVING
AND UNCERTAIN STANDARDS
APPLICABLE TO CITIES AND TOWNS
Cynthia M. Pols*
Since 1985, the Supreme Court has made several major rulings
of importance to cities and towns concerning the application of the
takings clause of the U.S. Constitution to land use regulation. Two
of the most recent of these rulings arise from land use disputes in
California and could well lead to new restrictions on the regulatory
authority of state and local governments. These cases do not set definitive and comprehensive rules on takings. Instead, they establish
some outside limitations on state and local regulation and leave
many of the important issues to future litigation. However, they provide indications of the Supreme Court's general direction on the issue and they establish new rules on several important questions.
For cities and towns, increased litigation arising from state and
local activities relating to zoning, planning, historic preservation,
growth and development control, and environmental conservation
and protection should be expected. The probable targets of litigation
include: down zoning, on- and off-site dedications, linkage programs,
impact fees, and construction moratoria.
I.

A.

BACKGROUND

The Takings Clause

The takings clause is contained in the fifth amendment of the
U.S. Constitution. It provides that "private property" cannot "be
taken for public use, without just compensation" and applies to state
and local government under an 1897 interpretation of the fourteenth
amendment.' It has served as an unclearly defined check on regula0 Cynthia Pols, who has been with the National League of Cities since 1979, is currently
serving as General Counsel to NLC's Office of Federal Relations. J.D. 1978, University of
Maine School of Law; B.A. 1971, Smith College.
1. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
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tion by all levels of government, including the federal government. It
is important to keep in mind that the takings clause does not limit
the ability of a city or town to make an outright purchase of property through the exercise of the power of eminent domain. In those
situations, because the property owner receives just compensation
through the condemnation process, the taking is valid under the fifth
amendment. The difficult question for the courts is: When does governmental action cross the constitutional dividing line into forbidden
territory and become an illegal taking? In this uncertain environment, the issue for city and town officials is what types of regulatory
activity will be considered so restrictive of the use of property as to
constitute a regulatory taking.
B.

Recent Developments

During a period of renewed interest in the issue, the Supreme
Court has established three important takings clause rules in the last
three years. First, procedural rules have been established which prevent premature actions by property owners to recover compensation
under the takings clause. Property owners cannot secure relief under
the takings clause until government has rendered a final and conclusive decision and an effort to obtain just compensation through
proper state procedures has been made and rejected. Second, a property owner is entitled to recover monetary damages for unconstitutional takings whether the taking is temporary or permanent. And
third, a regulation which is not narrowly and carefully tailored to
accomplish a clearly defined governmental objective is especially vulnerable to a takings clause challenge.
Of equal importance are the questions which remain open in the
wake of the recent decisions by the Supreme Court. The courts have
yet to clearly define the circumstances in which a city or town can
deprive a landowner of the entire economic value of his or her property without violating the compensation requirement of the takings
clause. The courts have yet to define clearly the exceptions to the
takings clause. In certain areas - most clearly in the safety area state and local governments appear to have broad discretion to regulate without infringing the takings clause. Less certain, however, is
the relationship between the takings clause and other types of regulation such as health and public welfare regulation. In fact, the Supreme Court could some day decide that certain governmental interests are less deserving of protection from takings clause challenges
than others. The critical question of how far a regulation can go

THE TAKINGS CLAUSE

19881

under the takings clause is diminishing the economic value of the
property to the landowner without actually extinguishing that value
is unanswered too.
II.

WHAT ARE THE PROCEDURAL RESTRICTIONS ON BRINGING

A

TAKINGS CLAIM?

The Supreme Court has established some procedural rules for
takings clause claims. These rules limit the circumstances in which a
takings clause claim can be adjudicated by a court and generally
protect cities and towns from premature takings clause challenges.
In the key case on procedure, Williamson County Regional Planning
Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank,2 the Supreme Court found that a premature takings claim by a landowner failed under the constitutional
principle of ripeness.
As the ripeness doctrine was applied by the Supreme Court in
the takings context, action by the relevant governing body must be
final before the action is reviewable under the takings clause by a
court. For purposes of this case, which involved a challenge to the
application of a zoning ordinance, this ruling meant that the landowner was required to apply for a variance before a court could decide whether a taking had occurred. Thus, governmental actions will
not be ripe for review until a final decision regarding the application
of the regulations to the property at issue has been reached. In the
Court's view, a determination of whether all reasonable beneficial
use of the property has been denied and an injury inflicted cannot be
made until the government has taken a final and definitive position
on the matter. A second procedural obstacle to the utilization of the
takings clause set out in the Williamson County case is that the
landowner must have invoked state procedures for obtaining compensation - for example, an inverse condemnation action - before a
takings claim can be brought. The exception to this rule is where
those procedures are shown to be unavailable or inadequate.
On a related question in another case, the Court found that a
landowner is required to show that he or she sought approval for
virtually all possible economic uses before a takings claim will be
considered by a court. In this 1986 case, MacDonald, Sommer &
Fratesv. Yolo County,8 the Supreme Court ruled that the landowner
must have sought a permit for less intensive uses than originally pro2.
3.

473 U.S. 172 (1985).
477 U.S. 340 (1986).
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posed and that these requests must have been denied before the decision will be considered final for purposes of judicial review. The reason the Supreme Court established this requirement is that "[a]
court cannot determine whether a regulation goes 'too far' unless it
knows how far the regulation goes." The ruling in the Yolo County
case affirms the continuing vitality of a favorable ruling for cities
and towns by the Supreme Court in the Penn Central Transp. Co. v.
New York City," case. That case involved the application of an historic preservation law to Grand Central Station in New York City.
In that case, the Supreme Court found the takings claim to be premature under the ripeness doctrine. Although a landmarks commission had denied a request for the right to construct a 50-story office
building above the terminal, the property owners had made no effort
to obtain approval for alternative plans such as a smaller building.
These recent victories on procedural questions have built-in deficiencies. They provide procedural protections which can be invoked
to postpone a final decision on the question of whether there has
been a taking. Other recent rulings - particularly the ruling on liability for temporary takings - suggest that such delays could be
costly if a court ultimately finds that a taking has occurred.
III.

WHAT

IS

THE REMEDY FOR

A

VIOLATION OF THE TAKINGS

CLAUSE?

The 1987 decision on the remedies question has greatly increased the liability potential for cities and towns. The Supreme
Court established clear and certain rules on the question of the remedy for a violation of the takings clause in First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles.5 In this decision, the
Court ruled that the takings clause entitles a property owner to compensation for economic losses during the entire time period in which
the constitutionally defective regulation was in effect. In making its
ruling, the Supreme Court focused on the compensation requirement
of the takings clause. The takings clause requires compensation for a
taking; it does not prohibit a taking of private property for governmental use. Under this analytical approach, the rule followed by the
California courts (and some other states) of invalidating the defective regulation did not in any way satisfy the compensation requirement of the takings clause.
4.
5.

438 U.S. 104 (1978).
107 S.Ct. 2378 (1987).
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This ruling does not mean that the city or town is required to
pay the property owner for the full value of the property. Rather, the
landowner is entitled to compensation for the losses incurred from
not being able to put the property to economic use. In many cases,
the losses may be small in relation to the actual value of the property
or the losses may be difficult to prove. The First English case involved a broad constitutional challenge to a county ordinance prohibiting the construction of new buildings in a flood protection area.
The California courts had originally ruled that the landowner could
ask the court to invalidate the ordinance under the takings clause,
but could not collect damages for the period in which the regulation
was in effect.
Before the First English decision, a city or town which lost a
takings case could simply rescind or revise the challenged regulation
and was not required to compensate the property owner unless the
regulation was continued in effect after the court determination. (It
should be noted, however, that, for some states, the remedies rule
established in the First English case was not new. The rule that
property owners must be reimbursed for temporary takings had already been implemented in a number of states at the time of the
First English decision by state courts.) The Supreme Court's ruling
grants property owners whose property interests are adversely affected by a regulatory taking legal rights generally comparable to
those of property owners whose land is actually condemned for public use through the eminent domain process. In the First English
case, the Court adopted Justice Brennan's reasoning in a dissenting
opinion in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,' as
the majority rule. A major criticism of the Supreme Court's decision
in the First English case is that it establishes a severe penalty but
provides no guidelines for ascertaining whether a law or regulation
has crossed the takings line. In dissent, Justice Stevens pointed out
that the immediate impact of the decision for cities and towns is
likely to be a "litigation explosion." The litigation threat, according
to Justice Stevens, could well impair the ability of state and local
officials to regulate the use of land.
IV.

WHAT

Is A

TAKING?

The question at the heart of the constitutional debate is where
the line should be drawn between a taking and permissible govern6. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
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ment regulation. The seminal decision in this area and the source of
many of today's problems was rendered by the Supreme Court more
than 50 years ago in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,' In that case,
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes observed in what was little more
than an aside, "[I]f regulation goes too far, it will be recognized as a
taking." Since this ruling, the courts have made a number of largely
unsuccessful efforts to draw the line between a taking and permissible regulation.
There is a distinction in the takings clause standards applicable
to a regulation restricting a property owner's use of the property and
a regulation allowing for the physical occupation of property. In
Loretto v. Teleprompter,8 the Supreme Court recognized this distinction and found a permanent physical occupation to be subject to
very strict scrutiny under the takings clause. The wide open area of
the law is the standards applicable under the takings clause to regulations which restrict the use of property. Since the Pennsylvania
Coal ruling, the courts have made repeated efforts to draw a line
between a taking and permissible regulation. Recent rulings, including a ruling in early 1987, reflect a general reluctance on the part of
the Supreme Court to define particular types of regulations as a taking. For example, in the 1978 Penn Central case, the Court refused
to find the application of a very restrictive landmarks law to be a
taking.
In Agins v. City of Tiburon,9 the Supreme Court laid out the
general parameters of the applicable test. Under that test, a land use
regulation may be considered a taking if it "does not substantially
advance legitimate [governmental] interests . . . or denies an owner
economically viable use of his land." The Agins test has been clarified by the Supreme Court in two recent rulings, one of which was
favorable for municipalities, the other adverse.
In the favorable ruling, Keystone Bituminous Coal Association
v. DeBenedictus,10 decided by a 5 to 4 vote on March 9, 1987 and
with a strong dissent, the Supreme Court focused on the nature of
the governmental interest underlying the regulation. The case involved a takings challenge to a Pennsylvania environmental law
which had been construed by a state agency as requiring that 50
percent of the coal beneath certain types of structures be kept in
7.
8.
9.
10.

260
458
447
107

U.S. 393 (1922).
U.S. 419 (1982).
U.S. 255 (1980).
S.Ct. 1232 (1987).
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place to ensure support for the surface of the land. The Court attempted to draw a distinction between the Keystone case and the
1922 Pennsylvania Coal case by finding that the earlier case involved only a dispute between owners of private property and did not
implicate health or safety considerations. The Court found the nature of the government's action, the state was responding to a threat
to the common welfare, to be critical. The purpose of the regulatory
program at issue in the case was to protect public health, the environment, and the fiscal integrity of the area. The Court also found it
important that the property owner had failed to show that he or she
could not profitably engage in business operations. On an issue of
central importance to cities and towns, the Court refused to allow
property to be broken down into segments in takings clause challenges. Under the approach proposed by the property owner, each
segment of a piece of property would have been treated as a separate
piece of property for purposes of the takings clause. The Court
firmly rejected the idea that there could be a taking of discrete parts
of a single piece of property. Several examples of the types of regulations which would survive takings clause scrutiny under this approach were cited by the Supreme Court. They include building setback requirements, limitations on the percentage of a lot which can
be occupied by buildings, and prohibitions on the building of structures within a certain distance of the property line. In many respects,
this decision tracks the Supreme Court's ruling nearly 10 years ago
in the Penn Central case where the Court refused to treat air rights
as a separate piece of property for takings clause purposes.
Chief Justice Rehnquist issued a strong dissent which must be
accorded extra weight in light of the bare majority in support of
regulation in the Keystone case and the evolving nature of takings
clause law. He objected to the concept of a broad exception to the
takings clause for health, welfare, and safety regulations which parallels police power regulation. He also suggested that "identifiable
segments" of a piece of property could be subject to a taking even if
other parts of the piece of property were usable.
The ruling in the First English case, while primarily remediesoriented, also highlights the gaps in the law of takings. In the First
English case, the Court worked around two standards-related issues
and left them for further clarification by the lower courts on remand
in the First English case and other cases. First, the Court made no
finding on the question whether the property owner was denied all
use of property under the flood control regulation involved in the
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case. It simply assumed for purposes of deciding the case that the
property owner had been denied all economically viable use of the
property. In fact, the county may prevail in lower court on remand
by showing that the property was still usable under its regulatory
program. Second, the Supreme Court also pointed out that the denial of all use of the property by the county would be permissible if
the regulations were enacted for safety reasons. In other words, there
is a broad "safety" exception to the takings clause under which cities
and towns can establish regulations which deprive the landowner of
the economic benefits normally associated with property ownership.
However, the scope of this safety exception has not been clearly defined, and the Court was silent on the critical question of whether a
comparable exception exists for health and/or public welfare
regulation.
In the last case of the 1987 Term on the takings issue, the
Court established a rule which fails to recognize the realities of governance at the local level where policies are frequently the result of
compromise and consensus building and the public record is frequently replete with the discussion of competing and inconsistent
objectives. In Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastal Commission," the Court
established what could prove to be a very difficult requirement in the
land use area. In an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, it reached
back to the 1980 Agins case to flesh out what is meant by the requirement that a regulation must "substantially advance" a governmental interest to avoid challenge under the takings clause. It found
in a 5 to 4 decision that there must be a close and precise relationship between the regulation at issue and the governmental objectives
which underlie the regulation.
At issue in the Nollan case was the imposition of an access requirement by a state agency as a condition for the grant of a permit
to demolish an existing bungalow and build a larger structure on
property located directly on the California coast. The permit was
granted on the condition that the public be provided with an easement to pass laterally across the beachfront portion of the property.
The state commission found the access requirement to be necessary
because the construction of the new and larger house would block
the view of the ocean, increase private use of the beach, and burden
the public's ability to gain access to the beach. The Court focused on
the fact that the access requirement meant that individuals would
11.

107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
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have a permanent and continuous right to use the property for passage along the beach. If a permit had not been required for construction of the building, then, according to the Court, the state could
have obtained access rights only by purchasing an easement from the
landowner for access-along-the-beachfront purposes. Justice Scalia
clarified the general test established by the Court in the 1980 Agins
case and found that not only must the state interest involved by "legitimate," but the regulation must also "substantially advance" that
interest. In other words, the Supreme Court transformed the Agins'
test into a tough two-pronged test. First, the governmental objective
must be legitimate, a test which Justice Scalia acknowledged the Supreme Court has yet to elaborate. Second, there must be a clear and
precise connection between the regulation and the state interest the "substantially advances" component of the test.
The California Coastal Commission had found several reasons
for imposition of the access condition. First, the new house, because
of its larger size, would limit the public's ability to see the ocean.
The wall-like effect of structures would interfere with the desire of
passers-by to use the beach and create barriers to the use of the
public beach. Second, the new house, because it was bigger than the
original house, would increase private use of the beach. The purpose
of the lateral access requirement was to counterbalance these new
burdens and was similar to permit requirements imposed on the use
of other nearby coastal properties. The Court found that the "lack of
nexus between the condition" and the purpose of the regulation
"converts the purpose to something other than what it was." The
Court thereby signalled its willingness to second-guess state and local governments on whether the means selected to realize governmental objectives is the most reasonable and whether the relationship between the means and the end is sufficiently well-defined and
close. For example, it suggested that such requirements as a height
or width limitation on the house or a ban on the construction of
fences would have been more reasonable methods to ensure visual
access of the ocean than the approach used by the state agency.
The Court questioned how a requirement enabling people on the
beach to walk along the beach (by traversing the beachfront portion
of the landowner's property) could in any way mitigate obstacles to
viewing the beach from ashore. Further, the access requirement did
not appear to relieve in any way overcrowding of the beach. The
state's case was somewhat weakened by objectives which the Court
saw as incompatible: on the one hand, the commission was concerned
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about barriers to the use of the beach; on the other hand, it was
trying to relieve beach overcrowding in imposing the access requirement. In a strong dissent, Justice Blackmun pointed out the rigid
nature of the Court's new requirement. The close and exacting relationship between benefits accruing to the public from a regulatory
requirement and the burdens imposed on the property owner appears
to go well beyond the requirement typically required by state courts
that the connection be rational or that the condition be reasonably
connected to the benefit.
V.

CONCLUSION

The development and refinement of takings law is likely to continue in the courts for many years. The Supreme Court has given the
lower courts more than enough to digest and has provided property
owners with ample reason to invoke the takings clause in disputes
with governing bodies. While litigation is likely to increase - after
all, uncertainty spawns litigation - it does not follow that liability
will automatically increase. It is likely that developers and other
property interests will make exaggerated claims as to the scope and
meaning of the recent rulings. They will make black-and-white statements that the takings clause prohibits various governmental actions
in an effort to obtain approval for projects with a minimum of regulation. City and town officials can also expect to hear equally forceful arguments on the other side. Such groups as environmental and
no growth forces, advocates of historic preservation, and other
groups with a stake in an aggressive regulatory program will contend
that the cases are narrow and not applicable to the particular regulation at issue. In this climate of uncertainty and conflicting claims,
detailed knowledge of the recent developments in the takings law is
the best protection for city and town officials.
In closing, it should be noted that the Supreme Court could address the takings issue in the 1988 Term and could create many
more problems for cities and towns. The takings case now pending
before the Court on appeal, Pennell v. City of San Jose,' involves a
challenge to a city rent control program and could provide the Court
with an opportunity to speak to the issue of economic regulation in
the takings context.

12.

107 S. Ct. 1346 (1987).

